a-weak-b est-response (NWBR) criterion (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) ; and sta b ility (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) .
We constructed two games to test for Nash behavior and six games to test the refinements against each other. In each of the six games there are two equilibria, one more refined and one less refined; e.g., a Nash equilibrium which is not sequential and a Nash equilibrium which is sequential.
An alternative, more conservative approach would be to pick one refinement and study it in a variety of games with different parameters. But if subjects then consistently choose the more refined of two equilibria we will not know whether they would choose even more refined equilibria if they were available. Our experiments avoid this shortcoming.
Furthermore our experiment does test each refinement in a variety of games with different parameters. Because the sets of equilibria are nested, (all sequential equilibria are Nash, all intuitive equilibria are sequential, etc.), our experiments thus test each refinement in several games.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define several refinements and illustrate them with the games used in the experiments, in section 3 we describe the experimental design, in section 4 we report results, and section 5 is a conclusion with ideas for further research.
A PRIMER ON REFINEMENTS
In the generic form of a signaling game there are two players, a sender S and a receiver R .
The sender S has private information summarized by his type t ET. Knowing his type S selects a message m EM which R observes before choosing an action a EA. R does not know t before making his choice, but his beliefs about t are characterized by a prior probability distribution P (t) over the set T which is common knowled g e. Preferences for S and R are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u (t, m, a) and v (t , m, a), respectively. The sets T, M, A are assumed to be finite.
For any finite set K let !!.K denote the set of all probability distributions over K. A signaling strategy for S is a function from types into messages q : T --> !!.M, where q (m I t) denotes the probability that S sends the message m given type t. A response strategy for R is a function from messages into actions where r (a I m) denotes the probability that R takes action a in response to the message m . Since u 0 and v 0 are assumed to be von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, we can extend the utility functions u and v to the strategy spaces associated with !!.A by taking expected values.
For any AE!!.r and m EM, define the best response correspondence for R by BR (A,, m) = argmax '£ v (t , m, r (m ))·'A(t) reAA teT and for any A c !!.r let BR (A, m) = U BR ('A , m).
A.EA
The concept of Nash equilibrium provides the starting place for analysis in games of complete information. The generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept of games of incomplete information in which signaling games are a subset is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967-68) .
Definition. 1 A Bayesian Nash equili b rium consists of strategies q, r, and beliefsµ(· I (t' lm)= q(m lt')·p(t') µ Lq(mlt) . P(t)
tET Part i) of the definition says that the signaling strategy of S is optimal for each type t E T given the response strategy of R. Part ii) says that R is selecting actions optimally for messages which are sent with positive probability ("along the equilibrium path"). Part iii) says that R uses Bayes' rule to update the prior belief P E !!.r after observing the message m knowing the sender's signaling strategy q.
Consider the signaling game depicted in Table 1 . The payoffs in the matrices are u (t, m, a) and v ( t, m , a). Each part of the table represents payoffs for a different message (mi. m2, or m3) for the possible types (t1 and ti) and actions (a 1 a2, and a3). We assume throughout thatP (t1) =P (t2) = .5. In game 1 there is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium path 2 generated by the following strategies: q (m 1It;)=1, i = l, 2, and r(a 1 Im 1 ) = r(a3 lm i) = r (a 1 1 m3) = 1. This is a pooling equilibrium because both types send the same message (m 1). No information about S's type is revealed by the message, so µ(t; Im 1 ) = P (t 1 ) = .5, i = 1, 2.
1. Although Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is usually not defined explicitly with respect to R's beliefs, defining it this way makes it easy to compare with the more refined equilibrium concepts discussed below. 2. That is, there are other Bayesian-Nash equilibria, but they are the same along the equilibrium path. • -Nash equilibrum path.
The game in Table 2 has a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium which is separating (each type sends a different message). Hence, upon observing either equilibrium message R can infer S's type. The equilibrium strategies are q (m1I11) = q (m 211 z ) = 1 and r(a 11 m1) = r(a 2 lm 2) = r(a2l m3) = I. n -Nash equilibrium path.
In games 1 and 2 the Bayesian-Nash equilibriun1 prediction is unique. However, in many games there is more than one equilibrium, and hence the theoretical prediction is ambiguous.
Several game theorists have proposed refinements of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept criteria which select equilibria that satisfy certain rationality restrictions, thus giving more precise behavioral predictions.
The most common criticism of the Bayeshian Nash equilibriun concept is that it does not restrict R's choice of actions "off the equilibrium path," that is, for m EM such that q (m I I)= 0 V 1 E T. Since the choice of signaling strategy endogeneously determines which messages are off the equilibrium path, "perverse" out-of-equilibrium behavior can generate implausible equilibrium predictions. One selection criterion rules out equilibria in which behavior off the equilibrium path is not optimal according to some belief about the type of S. For signaling games this criterion is equivalent to the sequential equilibrium concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982a) .
Definition. A sequential equili b rium consists of strategies q, r and beliefsµ(· Im ) E AT such that conditions i) and iii) of the definition of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium hold and condition ii) is replaced by:
aeA teT Table 3 shows a game in which there are two Bayesian-Nash equilibria, only one of which is sequential. The Bayesian-Nash equilibria which is not sequential is q (m 11 t; ) = 1, i = 1, 2 and r(a21m1) = 1, r(a2 lm z) = 1, r(a21 m3) =I. There is no belief over T which makes the action a2 optimal following m3 . However, if R plays a response involving only a1 and a3 rather than a z , S will send the message m3 rather than m 1 , thus upsetting the equilibrium. The unique sequential equilibrium for this game is q (m3 It;)= 1, i = 1, 2, and r(a21m2)=1, r(a2 lm z ) = 1, r(a 1Im3) = 1. s -sequential equilibrium path, n -Nash equilibrium path.
The sequential equilibrium concept refines Bayesian-Nash equilibria by requiring that out of-equilibrium responses be suported by some belief. However, these beliefs might themselves be unreasonable. The equilibrium refinements proposed by Cho and Kreps (1 987) and Banks and Sobel (1 987) require beliefs to reflect some thought about which types are likely to benefit from a particular defection.
Consider the game in Table 4 . There is a sequential equilibria with q (m2 It;) = 1, i = 1, 2, and r(a 1 lm1) = r(a31 m2)= r(a21m3) =I. To support this equilibrium µ(t1 lm1) must be greater than �; R must believe that the out-of-equilibrium message m 1 is more likely to have been sent by t1 than by t2 . (Recall that we assume priors P (t1) =P (t z) = .5.) However, the equilibrium payoff of a t 1 type from choosing m 2 is greater than any possible payoff from defecting by choosing m 1 whereas an a' t2 type could conceivably do better by defecting tom 1 than by sending the equilibrium message m2. Hence, it seems unreasonable to increase the probability placed on t1 after observing a defectionm 1. Since t1 could not possibly benefit and t2 might, it seems reasonable to believe a defection was from t2 (i.e., µ(t2Im1) = 1). Cho and Kreps (1 987) call this "the intuitive criterion". This belief implies a best response of a2 which provides an incentive for t 2 to switch and send a message m 1 thus upsetting the equilibrium. i -intuitive equilibrium path, ' -sequential equilibrium path.
The intuitive criterion can be stated more fonnally. Fix a sequential equilibrium with the associated equilibrium payoffs u *(t) for S, and for each out-of-equilibrium message define For the signaling game in Table 4 the unique sequential equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion is: q(m1It;) =1, i = 1, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a 1 lmz) =r(a1lm3)=1.
The logic of the intuitive criterion can be extended in various ways. Consider the game in Table 5 which has the following sequential equilibrium: q (m 21 t;) = 1, 2, and r(a3Im 1 ) = r (a3 I m2) = r ( a2 1m 1) = 1. This equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion since T1(m 1) = tj>, implying that µ(t1Im1 ) = 1 is contained in Li1(m 1), and a3 is a best response to µ(t 1 Im 1 ) = 1, while T1(m3) = {t; }, and a2 is a best response to µ(t2 I m3) = 1. However, given the equilibrium payoffs t2 would like to defect from the equilibrium and send the message m 1 for any possible response that would make t 1 want to defect, but there are some responses (e.g., a2) for which t 1 does not want to defect when t2 does. That is, the set of responses to m1 which induce t 1 to defect are strictly contained in the set which induces t 2 to defect. It seems reasonable to require that the belief µ(· Im 1) should assign greater weight (relative to the prior) to t 2 when m 1 is observed. This restriction is implied by the concept of divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987) . Fix an equilibrium with S payoffs u *(t) and let m be an out-of-equilibrium message. For all r E ti A define
as the frequency that t E T would send m if m induces a response of r. Let I'(r, m) = {yEL'lr : 3 µ(t) E µ(t, r) and C > 0 s. ty(t) = C·µ(t)·P (t) 'i tET}, where C is a constant normalizing the expression into the form of a probability. r(r, m) is the set of beliefs consistent with R responding to m with r where each t has the option of obtaining u *(t) or u (t, m , r ). Finally for any set ti i;;; tiA let
Note that r(tiA , m) i;;; ti1 (m) so that restricting beliefs to be in r(ti A , m) implies that any resulting equilibrium will satisfy the intuitive criterion. Further, if there exists t, t' E T such that Jl(t , r, m) = 1 implies Jl(t', r, m) = 1, then for allµ Ef(tiA, m), If it is common knowledge that R holds beliefs in I'(tiA , m ), then S should expect the message m to induce an action in BR (r(ti A, m ), m ). This suggests the fol lowing iterative procedure: let
A sequential equilibrium is diVine if for all out-of-equilibrium messages m,µ(A lm)E tid(m). For the game in Table 5 the divine equilibrium is: q (m3 I t;) = 1, i = I, 2, and r(a3 lm1) = r(a2 I m z ) = r(a 1 lmJ) = I .
The set of beliefs in !id (m) clearly can depend on the prior belief P ('), since divinity may only require that the beliefs assign greater (or equal) weight than the prior on types more likely to defect. The requirement that beliefs assign all positive probability to those types which are most likely to defect is called "universal divinity".
Consider the signaling game in Table 6 . There exists a divine equilibrium of the following fonn: a (m3 I t ;)= 1, i = l, 2 and r(a21 m1) = r(a 11 mz) = r(a1 lm3) = 1. Although t2 is more likely to defect to m 1 than t 1 since both types could potentially gain from a defection the prior belief P (t;) = � is in the set A d (m 1). Since this belief supports the equilibrium action a 2 the divinity criterion is satisfied. However, universal divinity requires us to place positive probability only on t2 because t2 wants to defect whenever t1 does, but not vice versa (e.g., t2 would defect, but t1 would not if r(a1Im1)=4,r(a21m1) = .6). That belief implies a best response by R of a1 breaking the divine equilibrium. The unique universally divine equilibrium for the game in Table 6 is : q(m1It;)=1, i = 1, 2, and r(a21m1) = r(a1 lmz) = r(a31mJ) = 1. 0,1 " -universally equilibrium path, d -divine equilibrium path.
As above, fix an equilibrium and let mEM ·be an out-of-equilibrium message. Let
Ar={P EAT: P( t )>Oif t E T}be the set of all nondegenerate priors overT. Define Definition. A sequential equilibrium is univers ally divine if for all out-of-equilibrium messages m, µ(·I m) E Au(m).
Consider the signaling game in Table 7 . There exists a universally divine equilibrium where q(m3 I t ;)= 1, i = 1, 2, and r(a1 lm1) = r(a3 lmz) = r(a21m3) = 1. At message m2 there are responses by R wh ich make t1 want to defect while t2 does not (e.g., r(a21 m2) = ; , r(a3 I mz) = � and there are responses such that t2 wants to defect while t1 would not (e.g., r(a 11 m z) = 1) . Hence, universal divinity does not place any restrictions onµ(· I mz). The set of best responses following m2 which sustain the equilibrium are r(a1 lmz) =0, r(a2 lmz) s; �, r(a3 lm2) � � (no belief supports mixing between a 1 and a3). The interior boundary of this set is r(a2 I m2) = �, r (a3 I m2) = �; this strategy makes t 1 indifferent between staying along the equilibrium path and defecting while t2 would prefer the equilibrium path. Hence, we can think of t1 as the most likely type to defect if we define "most likely" as those types for which the set of equilibrium strategies includes an out-of-equilibrium strategy for which lhe type has a weak-best response of staying along the equilibrium path. 0, 3 5,2 t1 1,6 5. 3 1,0 t1 2,1 3, 3 0, 4 t z 0,2 2,0 5,1 t z 4,0 4,1 0,2 t z 1,4 3,3 2,1 N -NWBR equilibrium path, " -universally divine equilibrium path.
Fix an equilibrium where m is an out-of-equilibrium message and define
If t E Tn (m) then if t is ever indifferent between staying along the equilibrium path and defecting there always exists some other type t ' which strictly prefers to defect. In the above example t2 = Tn (m2), since t2 is only indifferent when r(a2 I m2) = ! , r(a3 I mz) = � , and this strategy gives t 1 the incentive to defect. Define
Definition. A sequential equilibrium satisfies the never-a-weak-b est response (NWBR) criterion if for all out-of-equilibrium messages m µ(·Im) E An (m ).
The unique sequential equilibrium satisfying NWBR for the signaling game in Table 7 is: a(m21t;)=1, i = 1, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a1 lm z ) = r(a31m3) = 1.
Universal divinity and NWBR were initially attempts to characterize the restrictiveness of the concept of stable equilibrium (Kohlberg and Mattens, 1986) in signaling games. The stable equlibrium concept requires that every possible "tremble" of strategies have an equilibrium "close to" the candidate equilibrium. Since for signaling games there is a one-to-one relationship between trembles of signaling strategies and beliefs we can discuss stability in terms of every possible out of-equilibrium belief generating a nearby equilibrium. Table 8 consists of a game which demonstrates that NWBR does not completely capture stability. Consider the following sequential equilibrium: q (m1 It;)= l, i = l, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a1 I m z ) = r(a2 I m3) = 1. This equilibrium satisfies NWBR. At m2 there exists a response strategy making t1 indifferent while t2 prefers the equilibrium, namely (r(a1 lm2) = �, r(a21m z) = �. Thus, NWBR places no restrictions on µ(·I m z ). (At m3 it is clear that NWBR implies µ(t2 lm3) = 1 supporting the equilibrium path.) To see whether this equilibrium is stable we focus on trembles at m2. If a tremble generates a belief µ(t 11 mi!<: : , then a 1 is a best response and the equilibrium path is supported. If
is a best response, and again the equilibrium path is supported. Suppose a tremble induces a belief µ(11 I m2) e ( ; , � ); if neither type sends m 2 with positive probability R respond es with a 2 thus upsetting the equilibrium. What is needed is the ability for one or the other type to send m 2 with sufficient probability to make R indifferent between two actions and R to mix between the actions in such a way as to make the type(s) indifferent between m 1 and m 2 thus rationalizing the original mixing. Hence 11 or 12 must send m2 in such a way as to induce a belief of either µ(t1 lmi! = ! or µ(t1 lmi) = ; . At the former R could mix between a2 and a3 and such a mix could leave t 1 indifferent while 12 prefers the equilibrium path. At the latter R could mix between a 1 and a2 and such a mix could leave t2 indifferent while 11 prefers the equilibrium path.
For a tremble inducing a belief in ( � , ; ) if I 1 sends m 2 this would push the belief to µ(t 1) = ; ; however, this is the belief generating a response leaving t2 indifferent. A similar conclusion holds if t 2 would send m2• Thus, a tremble inducing a belief in ( ! , ; ) cannot be stabilized by a judicious choice of signaling strategy. Note that a necessary condition for such a stabilization in this game is that both types be on the boundary of the set of sequential equilibria; that is, stability is a refinement of the NWBR equilibrium concept.
Fix an equilibrium with m being an out-of-equilibrium message and for all J c T define JcC stabilized at the out-of-equilibrium message m. Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987) provide the following characterization result.
Theorem. A sequential equilibrium is stable if and only if for all out-of-equilibrium messages m, A*(m)=<jl.
In the above example the NWBR equilibrium is not stable since A *(m 2) = ( � , � ) ;t <jl. The unique stable equilibrium in this game is q (m21t;)=1, i = 1, 2 and r(a2Im1) = r(a2 I mi)= r(a2 lm3 ) = 1.
In summary we have the following nesting of equilibrium concepts: Bayesian Nash ::::i Sequential ::::i Intuitive =: Divine ::::i Universally Divine =: NWBR ::::i Stable.
Since Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) prove that every game has at least one stable equilibrium and the stable equilibrium is also NWBR, universally divine, etc., existence of each kind of less-refined equilibrium is also guaranteed.
EXPERIMENTALDESIGN
Our experimental design uses the games in Tables 1-8 to detennine which refinements subjects play most often. Games 1 and 2 test whether subjects play unique Nash equilibria, one pooling (game 1) and one separating (game 2). Games 3 to 8 all have two pooling Nash equilibria, one more refined and one less refined. In addition to the two messages which are equilibrium choices in games 3 to 8 we include a third message which is not an equilibrium choice. Each game then has Nash and non-Nash messages so we can test the robustness of Nash play in several different games.
Our experiment has three goals:
1. Test for robustness of Nash equilibrium play in several different games.
2. Test whether subjects play more refined equilibria (for several different nested refinements).
3. Test whether decision criteria (other than Nash equilibrium) can explain individual choices.
a.
The Experimental Session
The games were presented to subjects in two 3 x 3 payoff tables (see Appendix A for an example). Each of their choices were made and communicated on a computer network.
An experimental session consisted of many periods. In each period six subjects were divided into three pairs. One subject in each pair was the sender and the other subject was the receiver. To make each play as much like a one-shot game as possible, pairings were random and anonymous each period.
Subjects assigned to be senders were told their type (1 or 2) which was randomly determined. Receivers did not know the sender's type, but the two types were commonly known to be equally likely. After receivers were told their sender's message (m1, m2 or m3) they chose an action (a i. a 2 or a 3). A period ended when the receiver picked an action and all results (type, message, action and payoff) were transmitted to both players.
In each experimental session several games were played for 10 consecutive periods each.
Subjects knew the payoff matrix on their screen was Hie s:m1e for everyone and would be used for the ten periods. Subjects were given history of their own paired plays, but not the entire cohort history of plays. 
Tr eatment Variables
We conducted 13 experimental sessions. Each session has two important learning variables.
First, within an experimental session the sequence in which different games were played might affect learning. (Subjects were usually most confused and made fewer equilibrium choices in the first game in a session.) Second, we expect some learning across the ten plays of a given game. To check for sequence effects we varied the order in which the games were played in each session.
Each game was played first in a session at least once.
To distinguish behavior of subjects with different potential mathematical sophistication we used four subject pools. We ran experiments using students at the California Institute of Technology and the Universities of Arizona and Pennsylvania, and members of the technical staff at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Table 9 lists the experiments we conducted.
4. In most of the games the equilibria still hold under risk aversion unless subjects are sufficiently risk-averse that they prefer a payoff of $.25n to an even gamble between 0 and $.25 (2n + I) (for 0,; n ,; 3). Studies of choice indicate subjects are roughly risk neutral for bets of this size; e.g., Camerer (1988) . 12 Caltech 7,9,5,4** 13 Caltech 9,5,7,6** * These sessions included an unreported game. ** These games were conducted for 20 periods.
NOTE: Game 9 is the same as Game 8 except that we rearranged the payoff matrix so that the op timal action for receivers was not the same for both equilibria. We made this change after observing the strength of the stable equilibrium in Game 8. However, the results were indistinguishable (see the logit analysis in Appendix A and Figures 1 and 2 ). Therefore, we will pool all data from Games 8 and 9.
EXPERIMENTALR ESULTS
Nash Equilibrium Behavior
First we look at how often outcomes constitute a Nash-equilibrium message-action pair. Table 10 shows the proportion of Nash outcomes aggregated across all games. About two-thirds of the outcomes are Nash. We can easily reject the hypothesis that choices are random and in most games there is some convergence toward Nash outcomes between periods 1-5 and 6-10. 5
5. There is also a slight sequence effect: The overall proportions of Nash outcomes in periods one through five and six through ten for games played first in an experi mental session were .64 and . 71. However, the time series and summary statistics suggest the amount of Nash behavior is not consistent across games. Table 11 showns Nash and non-Nash behavior by game and refinement.
The Bonferonni X 2 statistics test the hypothesis that the proportions of Nash outcomes are equal in all games. We cannot reject the equality hypothesis in periods 1-5 (X 2 = 10.95, P = .19), but we can reject it (X 2 = 32.97, P = .01) in periods 6-10.
The variation in amount of Nash play is hard to explain parsimoniously. Logit analyses of the subject pool and learning variables (see Appendix B) suggest few systematic effects which can explain the variation in Nash play across games. Whether equilibria are unique appears helpful. Table 11 shows nearly 80% of the outcomes are Nash in later periods of games 1 and 2, but game 3 has two equilibria and even more (95%) of the plays are Nash. Or one might conjecture there is less Nash play in higher-numbered games with deeper refinements, but games 6 through 8 yield more Nash play than game 5.
b. Table 11 shows the fraction of responses consistent with each refinement. There is a lot of non-Nash play, but there is also some tendency to choose the more refined equilibrium. That tendency also grows stronger between periods one to five and six to ten. The time series graphs of outcomes for each game are in Appendix C. Table 11 Contingency Since there is some change between periods 1-5 and 6-10 we ran some experiments for 20
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periods to see if convergence would continue in the additional ten periods. Table 12 Proportion of Nash Outcomes in 20-Period Games Non-Nash .14 .00
.03
Non-Nash .
37
.07
.00
Non-Nash .33
.33
. 30 We can observe convergence graphically by computing 95% confi dence regions for the estimated probabilities of more refined, less refined, and non-Nash play (Pm• P1, P n ) in each game.
Since these probabilities add to one we can graph the confidence region for the three-dimensional vector in a two-dimensional simplex as in Figures 1 and 2 . 6 (The confidence regions are the two dimensional analogue of one-dimensional confidence intervals.) With the figures one can do statistical tests at a glance. If the confidence region for a game lies completely above the dotted line in the upper-left half of the simplex where Pm > P1 , then we can reject the hypothesis that Pm = P1
6. The confidence regions are based on the multinomial distribution (see Queensberry and Hurst . 1964, and Snee, 1974) .
Call the observed relative frequencies Fm,F1, andF11 and the population proportions P1,Pm• andP11• Call the sample sizeN and denote the 100(1-s) percentile of the chi-squared distribution with (2 degrees of freedom) by X. Then the 100(1-s) confidence region is the set of P1,Pm, andP, which satisfy (F;;tPm )+ (F,2!P1) + (F,'!Ph),; (X IN)+ 1. In earlier periods ( Figure 1 ) the confi dence regions are centered near the middle of the simplex where more-refined and less-refined play are equally likely. But in later periods ( Figure 2) the confidence regions for some games move toward the left edge of the triangle where Pz = 0 while games 6 and 7 stay near Pm = P1 and game 3 moves toward P n = 0.
One is tempted to conclude that subjects simply converge toward more refined equilibria up to a point--games 6 and 7 and game 8 is an outlier. This interpretation is wrong because of the nesting of refinements. In game 4, for instance, 68 % of the outcomes in later periods correspond to the intuitive criterion. But both equilibria in game 5 are intuitive (and hence sequential and Nash) and they are only played a total of 53% of the time. Thus the refinement which predicts well in game 4 works less well in game 5. (This is simply our point about !'-rash cutcomes-�t. 11.eir frequency varies across games--extended to the refinements.)
Similarly, the stable equilibrium is played 56% of the time in later periods of game 8. The nesting implies that in all other games the more refined equilibrium is stable and the less refined equilibrium is not, so every game is a test of stability. The stable equilibrium is played two-thirds of the time in games 3-4, but only a third of the time in games 5-7.
Thus the frequency of play of various Nash refinements varies across games rather mysteriously just as Nash play does. One way to explain the variation is to examine sender messages and receiver actions separately. It might be that senders always choose the more-refined equilibrium message, but receivers sometimes choose the best-response action from the less-refined equilibrium. (In our analysis so far such a message-action pair would be classified as a non-Nash outcome.) c.
Sender Behavior
A sender in our sigualing games must make a decision knowing his type, but not knowing (with certainty) the reaction of his receiver counterpart. Except for game 2 all our equilibria require senders to pool --ignore their type and choose the same message. "beer-quiche" game which pits an intuitive equilibrium against an unintuitive one.
7. The lo git model for sender messages in Appendix B suggests that : i) Ty pe dependence relative to the non-Nash Oess refined) message is game specific and significant in games l, 4, 5 and 7. ii) Subject pool and sequence have no sy stematic affect on the outcomes. Leaming is game specific; when it is significant it increases the probability of Nash message relative to non-Nash messages. b Denotes message which is best for the sender of each type, in equilibrum.
The equilibrium message which is better for (i.e., yields a higher payoff for) a particular sender type is marked with a superscript "b" in Table 13 . Sender types generally choose the better for message, thought not always. Type-dependence occurs if one equilibrium is better for type one, the other equilibrium is better for type two, and senders choose which is better for their type. But even the better-for rule is sometimes violated, as in type two's in game 6. Type-dependence due to the better-for rule helps explain why sender play is game specific. Other decision rules might help explain deviations too. We considered several decision criteria: 8 n. Nash message m. maximum message (maximizes sender's minimum payoff); see Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 278) p. principle of insufficient reason (sender regards each receiver action as equally likely)
e. empirical-best response (selects message which is a best response to the message-dependent actions that were actually played in periods six to ten). Table 14 shows the proportion of message choices by sender ty pe along with letters marking which message is selected by each criterion. No criterion or pair of criteria accounts for deviations fr om Nash messages especially well. However, when all the criteria (including better-for, not shown here in Table 14 ) select a message then senders choose it more than 80% of the time.
criterion often picks weakly-dominated strategies.) None of these criteria helped explain deviations from Nash. 
Receiver Behavior
In our games once receivers get a message they must choose an action without knowing the sender's type with certainty. Table 15 shows the number of receiver actions for each possible message in periods six to ten. Decision-criteria-selection actions are marked with letters. We denote the more-refined-message-action pairs by a box and the less-refined with a circle (deleting "n" markings), adding "d" to denote a weakly-dominated action. 9 Receivers rarely choose dominated actions. Their infrequency is a bit surprising because many of the actions are only dominated by mixed-strategy combinations of other actions. Also, receivers rarely choose actions if they are not empirical-best responses to messages. 10 9. The Io git model for receiver actions in Appendix B suggests that; i) subject pool and sequence have no systematic effect, ii) learning is game specifi c. 10. On the other hand, criteria "p" and "e" often coincide because the belief interval which makes an action a best response
Given that a sender transmits an equilibrium message the receivers do chose equilibrium actions most of the time. It seems that the blame for non-Nash outcomes must rest mostly on the senders, and their tendency to separate in search of equilibrium payoffs that are better for each type.
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We conducted a series of experiments to test whether subjects chose refined subsets of Nash equilibria in signaling games. In the experiments a sender was privately informed of a randomly drawn type then chose a message. A receiver knew the message, but not the sender's type, and chose an action. Each game was repeated ten times with subjects randomly reassigned in pairs in each repetition. Two of the games had unique Nash equilibria. The six other games each had two equilibria one of which obeyed a more st_ ri _ rigent refinement criterion t. 11.an the other. Our experimental design and treatments were ambitious and exploratory.
We conducted 13 experiments with four subject pools. Our conclusions are as follows:
About 70% of the message-action pairs gave Nash equilibrium outcomes. The frequency of Nash play differed across games.
b.
There was some tendency for subjects to choose the more refined equilibrium, but it depended on the specific game they played. No refinement predicted well in every game.
c. Even though all games except one predicted pooling equilibria senders often chose different messages depending on their types (they separated). Senders tended to choose the equilibrium message which gave the better payoff for their type which often caused them to separate rather than pool.
d. We tested whether several simple decision criteria such as minimax and principle of insufficient reason could explain why senders chose non-Nash and unrefined messages. No criterion worked very well, but when several criteria select to a particular message it was picked about 90% of the time.
There are two ways of thinking about equilibrium refinements . An extreme "logical" position is that refining is a search for an ideal set of formal rules which will refine the set of Nash equilibria to a single point in every game. "Intuitionists" take the opposite position, contending that refinements are useless because the plausibility of equilibria is self evident, varies across settings,
and cannot be captured in a set of formal rules. The fact that refinements differ in accuracy across games supports the intuitionist position. Our results might be disheartening for logical-school theorists , but they suggest one positive lesson: Always check whether equilibria are consistent with decision criteria like minimax. If they are consistent with several appealing criteria they are more likely to be played.
The game-specificity of refinement choices suggests further research should proceed in three directions:
usually encom passes bothP(t1) = P(ti) = . 5 (as the principle of insufficient reason assumes) and the empirically-observed :frequency of t 1.
(i) Simple refinements like sequentiality and the intuitive criterion predict fairly well in these and other experiments 11 games could be constructed in which those refinements make implausible unappealing choices because they conflict with other decision criteria to put those refinements to a tougher test.
(ii) Further work might suggest decision criteria which explain anomalous choices better than the several criteria we tried. It might help to gather more detailed data; e.g., one could measure subjects' beliefs and elicit contingent strategies (message choices for each possible type and actions for each possible message).
(iii) Game-specificity of results suggest refinements should be studied in specific institutional settings of economic interest. For instance, the Spence (1974) signaling model would be interesting to experiment with because it permits a \V ide variety of equilibria and has been widely applied. The Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) 11. See Miller and Plott (1985) ; Brandts and Holt (1987); Cramerer and Weigelt (1988) ; Pitchik and Schotter (1988); Cadsby, et al (1989) . You are about to participate in an experiment designed to provide insight into certain features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash.
The type of currency used in this marlcet is francs. All transactions will be in terms of francs. Each fr anc is worth .25 dollars to you. At the end of the experiment 30 francs will be subtracted from your total franc earnings. Your francs will then be converted into dollars at your specified rate, and you will be paid in dollars.
All communication during the experiment will be done through your computer terminal.
The expedment will proceed as a series of periods during which you will make decisions and obtain earnings.
At the beginning of a pedod each part icipant will be randomly paired with another participant in this experiment. Within each pair one individual will be assigned randomly as X and the other as Y. Each participant assigned as X in a pair will roll a die to determine their index. If the numbers 1 through 3 appear on the roll, the index will be I; if the numbers 4 through 6 appear, the index will be II. The actual value of the role will be X's own private information (the outcome of the roll will not be known to Y).
The participant assigned as X will then make a selection (A, B or C). Participants assigned as X will indicate their selections by using the cursor and selecting one of the rows A, B or C.
The participants assigned as Y will then be informed of the selection made by X, and then The first entry in each cell in the Payoff Chart is the amount to be received by X and the second entry is the amount to be received by Y. For example, under index I the cell B, F shows a potential earning of 1 francs for X and 12 francs for Y.
Individual earnings for each period will be determined as follows. Each participant assigned as X will be informed of their index and will be asked to make selection of A, B or C. The paired participant assigned as Y will then be informed of X's choice but not the index. Y will then make a choice of D, E or F. The index will then be announced to Y and Y choice will be announced to X. If the index was II the earnings for X would be 4 and the earnings for Y would be 2.
In review, the process is as follows:
1. At the beginning of a period, you will be paired randomly with another participant.
2. You will be assigned randomly as either X or Y.
3. You will be given a Payoff Chart. 4. Each individual assigned as X will roll a die to determine their index. 5. Each X participant will make a choice of ."-. , B or C. 6. Each individual assigned as Y will be informed of X's selection and will make a selection of D, E or F (without knowing the index).
7.
The index and selection of participants will be announced. 8. Earnings are calculated and placed in your Record of Earnings Sheet.
Feel free to earn as much as you can. Are there any questions?
..
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[gJ Thus, subject pool estimates are relative to the Caltech subject pool. Prob (Y; = Refinement)/Prob (Y; =Non -Nash) =b0* c; +b1*a; + b2*}; +b3*p; + b4* t; +bs* s; + b 6 *g; + b1*z;
where: c = dummy for Caltech subject pool a = dummy for Arizona subject pool j = durmny for JPL subject pool p = durmny for Penn subject pool t = period play of game s = sequence play of the game g = durmny for game 8 and 9 z = dummy for type = 1, 2 Prob (Y; = Refinement)/Prob Y, = Non-Nash) = b0*c, +b1*a, +b2*j, +b3*p, +b4*t, +b s *s, +b 5*gi +b1*z l; +b s*z2;
where: c = dummy for Caltech subject pool a = dummy for Arizona subject pool j = dummy for JPL subject pool p = dummy for Penn subject pool t = period play of game s = sequence play of the game zl = dummy for less refined message sent z2 = dummy for more refi ned message sent g = dummy for game 8 and 9
P(More)/P(Non-Nash) Note: The cohort number at the bottom of each histogram are tl1e experiment numbers used in Table 9 of the text. The letters above each stacked bar is the related subject pool where: �� ����� .. ... -
